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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Alyson S. Clark, Esq. 
Washington County Public Defender 
383 Broadway, Building B, Room 268 
Fort Edward, NY 12828 
Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Drake, Alexander, Coppola 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived July 2, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 902(?), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is. hereby: 
---l~~OLl...lo......=;L~-=!=-·· /Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview __ Modified to ___ _ 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de ~ovo interview - Modified to----
/ 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ __ _ 
· If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. -- . 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Ururs Findings and the seJfate fin®f 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Irunate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on Id ll J) q If : 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant~ Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold.  Appellant is incarcerated for two separate instant offenses. In one, he 
dragged a 12-year-old girl into his apartment, took off her clothes, and sexually abused her. In the 
second, while Appellant was incarcerated and while there was an order of protection against him, 
he wrote forty-five letters to his ex-girlfriend, including eight threatening letters. He then solicited 
and recruited a person to kill his ex-girlfriend. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board 
failed to provide him with due process; 2) the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious and 
irrational bordering on impropriety because of the emphasis on Appellant’s instant offense and 
criminal history; 3) the Board’s decision was predetermined because it did not consider his 
acceptance of responsibility and remorse; 4) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments 
to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was ignored and the statutes are now rehabilitation and 
forward/future based; 5) the Board’s decision was conclusory; and 6) the 18-month hold was 
excessive. These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
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A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses involving sexually abusing a young girl and, 
while incarcerated, sending threatening letters to his ex-girlfriend and recruiting someone to kill 
her; Appellant’s criminal record including prior failure on community supervision; his institutional 
record including improved discipline and completion of ART and SOP; and release plans to live 
with and work for his brother.  The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, 
the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, letters of support, and an official 
statement from the judge. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses, Appellant’s criminal record 
including prior failure while under community supervision, and Appellant’s lack of remorse. See 
Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Bello 
v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 
105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 
478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 
1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017). 
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to provide him with adequate due process is 
without merit. An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 
1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and 
thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of 
Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 
797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 
There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
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2000). Insofar as Appellant questions the Board’s consideration of Appellant’s expressions of 
remorse, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative 
fact-finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d 
Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 
N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and 
internal policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 
1371 (2000).   
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the 
Executive Law is without merit.  Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a 
fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on 
forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  The 
Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, 
including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 
A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014).  Thus, even where the First Department 
has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has 
nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every 
factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which 
emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).   
 
The Board satisfies section 259-c(4) in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of 
Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870; see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 
A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 
117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the 
Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was 
never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs 
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Thus, the 
COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 
N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board 
must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 
990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.   
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There is no merit to Appellant’s assertion that the Board’s decision was conclusory. The Board’s 
decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed 
to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. 
Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 
742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 
A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 
Finally, the Board’s decision to hold an inmate for up to 24 months is within the Board’s 
discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d 
Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. 
Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant has failed to demonstrate 
that a hold of 18 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
